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Existential Identity, Ontological Insecurity and Mental 
Well-being in the Workplace 
Introduction 
This paper sets out to investigate the potential impact that organizational policies and 
practices may have on existential identity. In particular, the intention is to introduce the 
concept of ontological insecurity as a means to explore the possible links between 
working life, existential identity and mental health problems. It is argued that many 
procedures adopted by organizations, including organizational development, 
surveillance and monitoring, along with pressure towards emotional labour and 
presenteeism represent direct, often deliberate, attacks on the existential identity of 
individual employees, which may result in psychosis, particularly among vulnerable 
employees. Much has been written on the economic and social damage that work 
related mental health problems can cause, but here we wish to emphasise the ethical 
aspects of the matter from an existentialist perspective (see author removed for review 
purposes 2006b). 
Mental well-being in the workplace 
Recent reports from organizations campaigning on mental health issues have 
highlighted the increasing incidence of mental health related problems in the workplace. 
For instance, a publication commissioned by the International Labour Organization 
reported 'an alarming increase' in the incidence of mental health problems, particularly 
depression, in workplaces in the UK, Finland, Germany and Poland (McDaid et al 2005: 
367). A slightly earlier report by the Mental Health Foundation in the UK describes how 
work-life imbalance can result in irritability, anxiety and depression, noting that the 
number of hours worked correlates positively with hours spent worrying about work - an 
effect that "can be summed up as a regressive tax on one's private thoughts" (Mental 
Health Foundation 2003: 4 ). 
Another report (Mind 2005) emphasises the by now well-known problem of the 
increasing incidence of stress occurring in employees and the link to mental illness. 
Stress is the greatest cause of absenteeism among non-manual employees and is 
clearly linked to conditions of anxiety and depression, which together now account for 
more incapacity benefit claims than back pain. These reports and others (e.g. Ivanov 
2005) suggest that nearly one third of the EU working population experience mental 
health problems and that one fifth are affected by specific conditions including anxiety 
and depression. This is in keeping with Doherty and Tyson's (2000) assertion that 
mental illness is the primary cause of reduced productivity and high staff turnover. 
What is interesting, and perhaps surprising from an ethical perspective, is that concern, 
even from mental health pressure groups, tends not to be with the plight of the 
individuals who actually have the misfortune to experience mental health trauma but 
rather with economic and organizational outcomes (productivity, absenteeism, turnover 
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etc). The arguments always seem to be couched in terms of the detrimental effect on 
balance sheets rather than the immorality of driving employees towards insanity. It 
seems that organizations are regarded as the unfortunate victims of the lack of mental 
well-being as opposed to the partial cause of the problem. 
The UK Health and Safety Executive {European Industrial Relations Review, 2005) 
identified that stress, depression and anxiety comprised the second most commonly 
reported illness affecting a sample of over half a million workers, and yet it is only 
recently that such illnesses are being treated as a health and safety issue. A landmark 
case was Walker v Northumberland Country Council {1995 1 AllER 737) where the 
plaintiff was awarded £175,000 on the basis that chronic overwork had caused him to 
have two nervous breakdowns. Whilst it is considered morally and legally wrong to allow 
a working environment to develop that is dangerous to physical well being, the same 
principles are only slowly beginning to hold regarding mental well being. Clearly, as we 
shall see, part of the difficulty stems from the perceived objectivity of physical health 
compared with the perceived subjectivity of mental health, but that does not invalidate 
the inconsistency in the approach to the problem. 
Overwork and job strain are indisputable contributors to all kinds of health problems, but 
here it is argued that a particular factor causing mental health problems is attacks on 
individual existential identity, which will now be delineated along with the associated 
concept of ontological insecurity. 
Existential identity 
According to Sveningsson and Alvesson {2003: 1163): 
"Identity is one of the most popular topics in contemporary organization 
studies, as in many other branches of the social sciences. Identity 
themes are addressed on a multitude of levels: organizational, 
professional, social and individual." 
Whilst this claim is not in question, relatively little attention has been paid to individual, 
personal, self, or, what we refer to here as, existential identity. Most discussions of 
identity in the business ethics literature concentrate on forms of collective identity 
{cultural , gender, corporate etc) and even across the wider management, organization 
studies and social psychology literature, where self-identity is considered, the accent 
tends to be on the social construction of identity, rather than on human agency 
{Woodward 2002: 1 ). Here we place the emphasis on self-identity as a personal, 
existentially created, albeit socially embedded, realm of consciousness. 
Traditionally, identity is a term: 
"Used to convey the relatively stable and enduring sense that a 
person has of himself [or herself]." (Bullock and Trombley 1999: 
413) 
And for the most part that is the correct way to view it. Self-identity is associated with 
related concepts such as, self-awareness, self-consciousness, self-esteem and self-
belief. It is recognised that multifarious sources can influence identity, including body 
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image, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, upbringing, life experiences and so forth. 
From our standpoint the overemphasis on the social construction of the self perhaps 
stems from the pre-eminence of Mead's (1934) work on identity where he distinguishes 
between the 'I' and the 'me', through his theory of symbolic interactionism. The 'I' might 
be described as the consciousness of the individual, whereas the 'me' is how the 
individual imagines others understand them, that is, their self-consciousness. To put it 
another way, whilst identity is to an extent a reflection of how we see ourselves, a more 
significant influence is how we believe others see us. Thus, as Woodward (2002: 8) 
concludes: 
"For Mead it is self-consciousness that provides the core of the 
self." 
Ultimately, according to the social interactionist perspective, the self concept is created 
by society, and requires social support to maintain it (Hayes 1994 p257). 
There is no disputing the importance of external factors in creating identity, but for the 
existentialist the emphasis is somewhat different. Sartre, for instance, offers three 
distinct usages of the 'self : 
"First, the self of prereflective consciousness; second, the self 
as ego or as personality; third, the self as value." (Barnes 1993: 
41 ) 
For our purposes it is the first usage that is significant. Specifically, the inference is that 
we are much less self-conscious than Mead suggests. Sartre's argument is that the ego 
is not always present in our thoughts, which is in contrast with what, for instance, both 
Descartes and Husser! believed. He distinguishes between two distinct forms of 
consciousness - unreflected consciousness (which is identical to what Barnes above 
translates as 'prereflective') and reflected consciousness (Sartre 1960: 43-60}. 
Unreflected consciousness is a consciousness of the first order, so the objects of 
consciousness are those objects outside of our self - there is no I in unreflected 
consciousness. Reflected consciousness, on the other hand, is of a secondary order 
because it involves a consciousness of our consciousness. In effect it takes the/, the 
ego, as an object of consciousness and treats it in relation to other objects external to 
the self. Sartre offers an example of running for a streetcar to distinguish between the 
two types. 'Normal' consciousness is unreflected such as when he admires a portrait or 
runs after a streetcar, there is no awareness of himself in his consciousness only an 
awareness of the object in front of him. It is only reflected consciousness when he 
becomes aware of his relationship to the other object - that he is late and has missed 
the streetcar he wished to catch - that the I appears in consciousness (Sartre 1960: 48-
9}. 
Notionally, it might be assumed that reflected consciousness is a good thing. It might be 
assumed that it is important to be self-aware so that we can accurately locate ourselves 
in our social milieu -it is at the heart of contemporary concepts such as emotional 
intelligence. However, self-consciousness is, in truth, a burden; a condition of 
consciousness which can result in an almost permanent state of angst. Unreflected 
consciousness represents an authentic state of freedom whereas reflected 
consciousness involves the individual constantly making identity-defining choices, whilst 
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at the same time perhaps feeling their identity being intruded upon by others. Angst is 
not about anything in particular, it has no object as such; rather it is a condition that 
draws from the generality of existence, its sources are uncertainty, freedom, possibility 
and responsibility, but to this list, if Sartre is to be believed, can added 'other people' 
(Sartre 1982). For the existentialist, angst represents an almost primordial and positive 
human condition. That is, a condition which reflects the authentic mode of existence. 
The person who is ridden with angst acknowledges their own freedom and the extent of 
their responsibilities. However, because the experience of angst is unpleasant people 
typically prefer to avoid it and a continuous state of angst can be completely debilitating. 
Ontological insecurity 
Many individuals go through their entire working lives without ever experiencing 
psychological problems, whereas others, under similar or identical circumstances may 
find themselves immediately and constantly prey to uncertainties regarding their own 
state of mind. This subjectivity associated with mental health matters is often taken for 
granted, but to understand how and why workplace activity impacts differentially among 
individuals we need a framework of understanding. The traditional view is to assume that 
some people are genetically predisposed to neurological disorder or that defective 
upbringing results in psychological flaws (Porter 2002), and whilst an existentialist 
approach does not reject these possibilities, it introduces the somewhat radical notion 
that what appear to be dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours might result from 
existential choices. R.D. Laing, perhaps the best-known psychiatrist associated with the 
existentialist tradition, offers the concept of ontological insecurity to explain why we find 
differences between individuals. 
Laing was not an existentialist as such, there were far too many different influences on 
his life and writings for him to be so pigeon-holed, however, he was sufficiently 
impressed by existential philosophy, including Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and, 
in particular, Sartre, that he set about applying this thinking to understanding 
schizophrenia. In The Divided Se/f(1990 first published1960) Laing's argument is that 
contemporary psychiatry treats the patient as an isolated organism that exhibits certain 
socially undesirable behaviours that are to be 'cured' at the organic level by whatever 
means necessary - be the means drugs, electro-shock or a lobotomy (Laing 1990: 20-
26). This narrow 'scientific' perspective ignores all other possible explanations of 
madness. He notes: 
"It seems extraordinary that whereas the physical and biological 
sciences of it-processes have generally won the day against tendencies 
to personalise the world of things or to read human intentions into the 
animal world, an authentic science of persons has hardly got started by 
reason of the inveterate tendency to depersonalise it or reify persons". 
(Laing 1990: 23) 
Interestingly, thanks, at least in part, to the work of Laing and others who shared his 
beliefs, psychiatry has moved on from such an inhumane state of affairs, however, as 
we shall see, there is still a tendency for contemporary organizations to depersonalise 
and reify the individual. 
Laing claims that psychotic conditions frequently do not result from physiological 
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imbalances but from existential choices that are made in the face of what he calls 
ontological insecurity. Care has to be taken in the use of a term like ' insecurity' , as it is 
often used quite carelessly, simply to excuse inappropriate behaviour ("he's OK really, 
just insecure, so you never know what he will do" - Myerson 2001 : 57), but here it refers 
to a deep-seated sense of self. Laing uses the term ontological not in its usual 
philosophical sense, but in an empirical sense that is the closest adverbial or adjectival 
derivative of 'being' he could locate (1990: 39}. In other words ontological insecurity is an 
insecurity of being - literally a matter of life and death. 
According to Laing the ontologically insecure person is {1990: 42}: 
"Precariously differentiated from the rest of the world, so that his 
identity and autonomy are always in question[ ... ) If a position of 
primary ontological security has been reached, the ordinary 
circumstances of life do not afford a perpetual threat to one's own 
existence. If such a basis for living has not been reached, the ordinary 
circumstances of everyday life constitute a continual and deadly threat 
[ ... ) If the individual cannot take the realness, aliveness, autonomy, and 
identity of himself and others for granted, then he has to become 
absorbed in contriving ways[ ... ) of preserving his identity, in efforts, as 
he will often put it, to prevent himself losing his self." (Laing 1990: 42 
emphasis added) 
Most people (hopefully) have a clear sense of space, time, continuity and, in particular, 
their presence and reality as lived out in the world . They have relatively little difficulty in 
confronting the hazards of life, be they physical, social, ethical or whatever, - they are 
ontologically secure (Laing 1990: 39). However, for the ontologically insecure person life 
is a state of perpetual angst (anxiety). Earlier we noted that angst is a positive and 
necessary mode of being, but also that perpetual angst is a different case altogether. 
Laing identified three forms of anxiety encountered by the ontologically insecure. 
Engulfment- the fear that relationships with other people or things, or 
even with oneself, will result in a total loss of self-identity and autonomy 
(existential death). Clearly, the logical strategy for self-preservation is 
isolation. (Laing1990: 43-5) 
Implosion - a sense of emptiness and the corresponding fear that 
contact with reality will result in a rush to fill that emptiness that again 
threatens self-identity and autonomy. (Laing 1990: 45-6) 
Petrification and Depersonalisation - the sense of feeling that one is a 
thing, a rock or automaton, rather than a person and the urge to treat 
others as though they are not people either. (Laing 1990: 46-7) 
The cause or causes of these forms of anxiety may be many and varied (and need not 
be physiological) but that is not Laing's concern. What is his concern is that the strategy 
-the behaviour - used to cope with ontological insecurity is drawn from lucid choices that 
connect perfectly with the patient's predicament - a fundamentally anti-deterministic 
position. In Sanity, Madness and the Family Laing and Esterson (1970) proposed that 
some forms of madness were largely social creations exacerbated by patterns of hatred 
and affection, manipulation and indifference within the family. In an interesting parallel it 
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seems reasonable to suggest that in the early Twenty-first Century, with increasing 
economic activity rates and the decline in family units, the workplace has replaced the 
family as the main social environment. 
Laing applied his arguments to individuals with acute psychoses, particularly 
schizophrenia, and used them to explain how the seemingly strange behaviour of the 
schizoid, including catatonia, aggression, objectification of others and so on, can 
represent meaningful and rational attempts to deal with identity crisis. Acute psychosis 
may seem far removed from the experience of everyday employment, nonetheless, 
present day Laingians no longer consider ontological insecurity to be the sole preserve 
of the psychotic - we all experience it to a greater or lesser extent. According to the 
Director of the Society for Laingian Studies: 
"The term schizoid was not restricted only to extreme forms of 
psychosis because most everyone experiences some degree of 
schizoid splitness at times in their lives. The defensive behaviour of 
'normal' - that is ontologically secure- individuals differ only in degree, 
not kind, from that of ontologically insecure people." (Potter 2001) 
The argument here is that, if we all suffer a degree of ontological insecurity, then specific 
organizational policies and activities that impinge upon individual existential identity have 
the potential to exacerbate mental health problems among all employees. As we have 
mentioned, the economic implications of this matter are often referred to by pressure 
groups, such as those mentioned earlier, but the moral dimension is rarely considered. 
The employment relationship and workplace practices 
The increasing incidence of work related mental health problems comes as no real 
surprise, and whilst long working hours and the problems of work/life balance contribute 
a great deal they are not the entire explanation. Organizations often pursue their 
interests, in the first place, by ensuring through careful selection, using personality 
diagnostics, that only those able to demonstrate mental stability are employed. However, 
in a somewhat contradictory fashion , they then proceed to make a sustained assault on 
existential identity in an attempt to optimise conformity, loyalty and performance. 
With only a hint of parody Jackson and Carter (2000) offer a description of the typical 
employment relationship to illustrate the type of employee that organizations are wishing 
to create: 
7 
"If we look at the typical requirements that are demanded of people 
when they join an organization as employees, it is possible to infer from 
those requirements a 'model of a man' (sic) which is suggested. For 
example: 
Employees are expected to Which suggests 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Allow their time to be organised • This is what parents do for their 
for them; CHILDREN; 
Do what they are told to do, in • A person who decides for him 
the way that they are told to do or herself is autonomous, one 
it; deemed unable to do this is 
treated as an AUTOMATON; 
Sell control of their bodies to • People who sell their bodies 
their employer, along with are known as PROSTITUTES; 
control of their labour; 
Allow themselves to be • Willingness to accept being 
disciplined; disciplined might be a sign of 
MASOCHISM; 
Punish others who are naughty; • Willingness to accept this role 
might be a sign of SADISM; 
Surrender moral responsibility • The archetype who gave up his 
for what they do, or produce, moral responsibility for gain 
for the organization; was FAUST; 
Place the interests of the • Such self-sacrifice on behalf of 
organization before their own others is ALTRUISM; 
interests; 
Accept that those who manage • Accepting that those with 
them deserve more money, higher formal status than 
better conditions etc. than oneself are intrinsically better 
themselves. than oneself suggests feelings 
of INFERIORITY. 
Put all this together, give it a good stir, and what do you get as the 
typical employee? A sadomasochistic Faustian altruistic child-like 
automaton prostitute with feelings of inferiority! Does this describe you? 
If not, you may not be suited to modern organizational life." (Jackson 
and Carter 2000: 158) 
There are numerous commonplace organizational practices used to challenge the 
existential identity of employees and to shift them towards the desired 'model of man'. 
These practices, perhaps depending on the ontological insecurity of each individual, 
may have a detrimental impact. Most commentators seem to consider such practices as 
a legitimate control of identity rather than as potentially damaging and unethical 
activities. However, to suggest that organizational activities might be viewed as attacks 
on existential identity, as opposed to necessary attempts to manage employee 
behaviour is not unreasonable. In a sympathetic discussion of 'the self , quite untypical 
of the organizational behaviour genre within which they write, Jackson and Carter (2000: 
159) argue that: 
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"Because behaviour is a manifestation of desire, anything that anyone 
does in an organization needs to be understood as a manifestation of the 
self." 
In the light of such a position they claim that: 
"Whichever the particular view taken of how desire works, motivation has 
to be seen as coming from within, and as inaccessible to being managed. 
Most especially, desire and motivation cannot be managed when the 
principle objective of those who seek to manage it is to satisfy their own 
desires, and to represent the desires and interests of those who benefit 
most from the way work is organized -the owners." (2000: 159) 
Nonetheless, there is constant effort to manage the desires of individuals. We argue that 
a crucial strategy to this end is the undertaking of attacks on existential identity. Such 
assaults may be an unintended by-product of organizational activity (which is no 
excuse), but on occasions the attacks are quite intentional. Here we set out to illustrate 
some of the organizational practices that undermine existential identity, however, the 
underlying question is always to what extent it is ethical to undertake activities that may 
undermine existential identity- and what duty of care do managers have in judging the 
ontological insecurity of their subordinates. 
Of course, a number of organizations are portrayed as following good practice in 
addressing the mental health of their employees and are recognised as satisfying a 
social and moral responsibility towards people. However, there may be a paradox here in 
the light of our discussions on identity, because there is a belief that those organizations 
that recognise the connection between employee well-being and organizational success 
are also those most likely to adopt a unitarist frame of reference to employee relations. 
Thus, they are likely to view HRM as a mechanism to bring about 'transformational 
change' that requires employees to shift their attitudes and values in order that they are 
accommodating towards, and congruent with organizational changes (Doherty and 
Tyson 2000). The techniques of 'organizational development (OD) are often the main 
drivers of changing attitudes and beliefs, but arguably those exact same techniques 
represent the most pernicious and direct challenges to existential identity and, therefore, 
individual mental health. 
Organizational Development 
The techniques of OD, and its close cousin HRD, are well known. From its origins in Kurt 
Lewin's unfreeze-change-refreeze model it is clear that OD intentionally violates the 
sanctity of existential identity. Despite assertions from practitioners and supporters of OD 
that individuals should not be coerced into divulging information about themselves 
(French and Bell1999 p267), there is plenty of evidence that OD techniques associated 
with HRD and culture management are designed to target existential identity, which 
necessarily involves some degree of coercion. 
Woodall and Daniel {1999: 121), reinforce this view when identifying the assumptions 
upon which culture management is based. 
• effective management involves the alignment of values 
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• values can be easily changed 
• only management can change these values 
• successful organizations have strong cultures 
It goes without saying that setting out to alter someone's values must reach to the heart 
of that person's identity. In the past 00 consultants have used T-groups (a form 
sensitivity training in which the learners use feedback, problem solving, and role play to 
gain insights into themselves, others, and groups) as mechanisms for deconstructing the 
individual in the presence of others so as to build back a collective sense of identity in 
keeping with organizational objectives. Their use has declined as a result of the 
controversial techniques utilised, but today commonplace team building exercises adopt 
a similar approach. For instance, employees from all levels of public and private 
organizations are sent on 'outward bound' style programmes that are closer to military 
training than administrative training. Participants might be expected to partake in pot-
holing, orienteering or nautical activities- all of which are intended to be 'character 
building'. There is an obvious concern for the physical safety of participants on this type 
of programme, but there must also be concern for psychological safety as individuals 
feel pressurised to 'prove their worth' (Woodall and Daniel 1999). Of course, many 
people enjoy the challenge of this type of training, but if an individual is ontologically 
insecure their sense of self worth is missing and so any experience of failure - real or 
imagined - could tip them into psychosis. 
Cultural management programmes of the type that are sometimes described as ' inward 
bound' are, as the name implies' very direct attempts to influence the individual psyche. 
These methods of 'training' often expound a spiritual standpoint and involve participants 
'opening up' to colleagues in attempts to establish important organizational competences 
such as faith and trust. Perhaps, in keeping with 00 codes of conduct, there is no direct 
coercion of involvement from programme facilitators, but there doesn't need to be as 
pressures and sanctions applied by organizational leaders have already been 
internalised. The real problem is that whilst the secure employee is likely to be able to 
defend their self, perhaps by presenting a trivialised front or simply lying, the 
ontologically insecure participant will not recognise the possibility of such a strategy. 
The media has taken an interest in some of the more extreme examples of this type of 
training. Programmes adopting the controversial principles of Californian personal 
development guru (and one time used car salesman), Werner Erhard were criticised in a 
BBC (1992) documentary for using techniques such as Angel Hands (involving sitting in 
a circle with others and being encouraged to emote about personal and painful subjects 
whilst being touched, hugged and stroked by 'helpers') and Fire Walking (walking 
barefoot across red hot coals). A number of attendees were interviewed and each 
claimed that psychological damage was done to either themselves or others as well as 
attesting to the pressures to attend and complete the programmes, despite considerable 
doubts about their efficacy and ethics. 
The Times newspaper claimed that: 
"Management training, self improvement and prosperity courses 
offered to professionals and companies in Britain by American 
consultants are using disturbing New Age methods that can do more 
harm than good, according to an investigation by The Times. Senior 
managers have lost their jobs, experienced nervous breakdowns or 
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been unable to continue with personal relationships after taking the 
courses. They use simple but effective mind persuasion techniques 
which can have a devastating psychological effect.n (Clancy 1992} 
Despite a concerted review of contemporary sources, there appear to be no similar 
criticisms of OD techniques being aired at the present time. However, there is no reason 
to assume that there has been any decline in the use of such techniques in a current 
organizational climate that still promotes culture management and HRD. 
Surveillance and Privacy 
A second, and increasingly commonplace, organizational practice that impinges upon 
existential identity is the use of surveillance in the workplace and perhaps beyond . 
Generally, from an ethical standpoint, two connected issues of concern are highlighted 
by commentators. First, regarding the individual's right to privacy, and second, the extent 
to which constant surveillance results in conditions of stress and anxiety. 
Generally, ethicists consider privacy to be a moral right (Miller and Weckert 2000). 
Brown (2000) explores the impact of a lack of workplace privacy by drawing together a 
number of themes from seminal sources and integrating them into 'a model of adaptation 
of self to panoptic power'. In a rare reference to ontological (in)security within the 
business ethics literature, Brown (2000: 62) notes how loss of privacy can create 
feelings of vulnerability, violation and shame among vulnerable employees. The sense of 
being untrustworthy, of being treated like a child or a criminal can be all consuming. It is 
perhaps true to say that the monitoring of keystrokes, email, voicemail and internet 
traffic, along with CCTV coverage is endemic among employers. Any jobs involving the 
use of information technology lend themselves to EPMCSs (electronic performance-
monitoring control systems) which has the effect of rendering no realm of employee 
activity beyond the gaze of the employer (Alge 2001 ). Matters worsen when we consider 
that even back in 1993 a survey of members of the Society of Human Resource 
Management in America found that up to a quarter believed that smoking habits, political 
activities and hobbies outside of the workplace were all legitimate subjects of 
management scrutiny (Brown 2000: 62). 
There is evidence to suggest that employees subjected to EPMCSs, particularly in 
environments such as call centres, are likely to experience increased levels of anxiety 
and stress, simply from the increased pressure to perform and the concomitant sense of 
loss of control (DiTecco, Cwitco, Arsenault and Andre 1992; Smith, Carayon, Saunders, 
Lim and LeGrande 1992). However, some are now suggesting that recent research 
indicates a shift in the attitudes of employees towards electronic monitoring. For 
instance, Lee and Kleiner (2003: 77-8) claim that: 
USince electronic monitoring has become popular in the workplace, 
employees seem to have adapted to this situation. Now, employees 
know that they are safe as long as they do their jobs; the 
nervousness about monitoring lessens. A reduction of anxiety will 
decrease job stress and health problems of workers." 
On the surface this may appear to be a positive development perhaps resulting from the 
more sensitive management of monitoring systems promoted by bodies such as the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE 2001 ). On the other hand, in keeping with Brown's 
notion of the 'adaptation of self to panoptic power', it may represent a victory for the 
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employers over the employees' sense of identity, with the latter becoming more passive 
in the face of the onslaught - retreating further in towards their core identity; their 
minimal self (Lasch 1985). As the core erodes the sense of ontological insecurity 
incubates and mental health problems may be being stored up for the future. The idea 
that the nature of work typically associated with EPMCS, in call centres for instance, is 
depersonalising is not new, but if we connect depersonalisation to petrification, as Laing 
does in explaining the anxiety of the ontologically insecure, then the notion takes on 
more worrying overtones. The subject that constantly has his or her privacy invaded not 
only fears petrification, but also is likely to depersonalise others (that is, objectify them) 
in an effort to stave off existential death. 
Emotional Labour 
The quality of service delivery is seen as being ever more important in both public and 
private sectors of the economy and with its higher status comes an obligation for 
employees to participate in emotion work. In most service orientated occupations, social 
interactions with customers, clients and patients form a significant part of the job. 
Furthermore, promulgating and maintaining a first-rate corporate image is also 
considered paramount for organizations and that too can demand emotional labour. As a 
consequence, employees are expected to project their role and their organization in a 
positive, enthusiastic and committed way and in order to do so, employees often have to 
falsify and/or suppress their true emotions. On the surface this practice of emotional 
labour may seem innocuous, however, it has been found to impact negatively on the 
mental well-being of employees, especially when low job autonomy or high job 
involvement is evident. As Zummuner and Galli (2005: 355) explain 'the regulation of 
emotions implies psychophysical effort, hence psychophysical cost, with implications for 
workers' psychological well-being'. 
The regulation of emotions in the work context was first discussed by Hochschild (1983) 
when she discovered a variety of negative health consequences among flight attendants 
(for whom emotion work is a requisite) including psychosomatic symptoms, and alcohol 
and sex problems. Recent evidence continues to support this understanding describing 
how in some cases 'emotional labour can amount to emotion exploitation and can cause 
depression, alienation, exhaustion and loss of identity' (Constanti and Gibbs 2005: 1 05). 
The growing numbers of call centre workers, as we noted not long ago, who are the 
most likely type of employee to experience intensive monitoring, are also likely to 
experience emotional dissonance, emotional exhaustion and therefore, mental health 
problems (Lewis and Dollard 2003}. 
The experience of 'emotive dissonance', that is, feigning an emotional presentation that 
is at odds with a personal sense of emotional self, undermines existential identity (Mann 
1999: 351 ). The state of dissonance drives the sufferer to try to achieve consistency and 
consonance. The emotional presentation is non-negotiable if the emotion worker wishes 
to keep their job, and so it is the emotional self (the way that they really feel) that has to 
be adjusted to relieve the tension. Ultimately, emotive dissonance can lead to 'personal 
and work-related maladjustment such as poor self-esteem, depression, cynicism and 
alienation from work, (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993: 97). Furthermore, it is a known 
cause of 'burnout' , which is described as 'a syndrome of emotional exhaustion and 
cynicism that occurs frequently among individuals who do "people work"', (Maslach and 
Jackson 1991: 99). 
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This apparent lack of authenticity in social interactions is not just limited to employee-
client interactions. In attempting to foster desirable corporate cultures, employees are 
often encouraged to exhibit similar emotional labour in encounters with fellow 
colleagues. Mann (1999) found that not only is nearly one-third of communication 
between managers and colleagues faked, but also that genuine negative feelings are 
only revealed in 2 per cent of conversations. The suppression of emotions not only has 
the potential to aggravate psychological well-being, it also can have adverse 
physiological effects. Anger, thought to be one of the most commonly concealed 
emotions in the workplace, should of great concern given the correlation between anger 
suppression and physical illness such as coronary heart disease (Mann 1999). 
Hochschild (2003) distinguishes between two forms of emotional labour, referred to as 
'surface' acting and 'deep' acting, and it is perhaps important to consider this distinction 
in relation to our concern for existential identity. From an existentialist perspective 
perhaps of most significance is surface acting, whereby individuals temporarily suppress 
job incongruent emotions to display more fitting ones. It is this form of acting that has 
been found to positively correlate with exhaustion and depersonalisation, especially 
when employees experience a greater frequency of emotional labour with lower levels of 
duration. It is thought that the increasing regulation of emotions results in employees 
distancing themselves from the clients/customers and treating both the clients and 
themselves as mere objects (Zammuner and Galli 2005}. Also, the effects of emotional 
labour have been associated with increases in withdrawal behaviour (Feldman and 
Morris 1996). It would appear that emotional labour has the potential to result in the 
forms of anxiety that Laing describes. If relationships in the workplace cannot be trusted 
then engulfment is a real possibility as an employee may experience their true emotions 
being squeezed out by the demands of the organization. Clearly, depersonalization is a 
danger, bearing in mind the stripping away of potentially deep seated values and 
emotions, the void to be filled by the burdens of the role, clients and colleagues 
(implosion). 
On the other hand 'deep' acting is defined by Hochschild (2003: 33) as emotional labour 
at the level which deceives oneself as well as others. This idea has an intuitive appeal, 
but is unsustainable from an existentialist viewpoint because self-deception is logically 
impossible (Sartre 1996: 49-50) and although a discussion would be fascinating we do 
not have the space to pursue it here. To reiterate, those with a strong sense of 
ontological security may have no difficulty in engaging in emotional labour- they may 
even enjoy it in the way an actor enjoys a role. However, employees with any degree of 
ontological insecurity may feel in significant peril. 
Work-life balance and presenteeism 
Lastly we wish to address the issue of presenteeism and how it impacts upon work-life 
balance. Presenteeism is a recently applied epithet used to describe circumstances 
where employees are attending work while ill (physically or mentally) and so unable to 
function properly (Hemp 2004: 49), although others offer a broader definition that 
incorporates the idea that it is not necessarily linked to overwork: 
"The opposite of absenteeism, in which employees are so scared of 
losing their jobs through downsizing, delayering or just simple 
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redundancy that they work excessive hours or remain at work in the 
evenings in order to be seen to be there even when there is nothing 
to do." (Quinion 1996 at www.worldwidewords.org/turnsofphrase/to-
pre1.htm) 
Presenteeism is acknowledged as being disadvantageous to both individuals and 
employers (Hemp 2004) and yet it is encouraged in organizations by reward 
mechanisms designed to cut down on malingering (BBC 2004} and because it is the only 
means by which employees can demonstrate what they believe to be the commitment 
expected by employers (Author removed for review purposes 1999, Author removed for 
review purposes 2006a). 
It is conceivable that presenteeism operates as a 'double bind' for some workers. On the 
one hand it represents a possible strategy of activity coupled with isolation adopted by 
the ontologically insecure employee to ward off the fear of engulfment. Immersing 
themselves in their work, to the exclusion of other considerations, allows the individual to 
keep busy and at the same time avoid relationships that they fear may engulf them. In 
other words they isolate themselves in the role in order to avoid confrontation with the 
organisation or other aspects of their life. 
On the other hand, presenteeism has the potential to restrict the opportunity for access 
to therapeutic activities. At the beginning of this paper we referred to the Mental Health 
Foundation's assertion that working long hours correlates positively with time spent 
worrying about work, which amounts to a "regressive tax on one's private thoughts". If 
the Foundation is correct, then many employees may not have even the ability to retreat 
into the sanctuary of their own psyche when faced with challenges to their existential 
identity. 
Numerous recent surveys indicate the extent of work overload and problems of work-life 
balance. A study of 1654 respondents by the Work-Life Balance Centre (2006} found 
that the vast majority worked more than their contracted hours (35-40}; nearly half found 
it difficult to balance work and home life; over a quarter claimed they never could; over 
half claimed that being unable to cope with work pressures endangered their health; and 
an additional third said that work demands were definitely affecting their health. A similar 
Mental Health Foundation (2003) survey involving 577 workers showed that one in six 
people worked more than sixty hours per week and one in three more than fifty hours. 
This form of presenteeism results in what the Foundation refers to as 'building out', 
which is the neglect of all other activities outside of work. The most frequently sacrificed 
activities were (Mental Health Foundation 2003: 18): 
• Exercise ( 48% of respondents) 
• Time with partner (45%) 
• Socialising (42%) 
• Hobbies and entertainment (41%) 
The concern is that all of the above activities are known to promote mental well-being. 
To a considerable extent, also, it is these types of activity that enable us to construct and 
preserve a sense of self. It is in safe environments were a sense of control is maintained 
that ontological security can be reinforced. 
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Conclusion 
We have claimed here that there is a great deal of what organizations do to employees 
that acts as direct and often deliberate attempts to challenge the individual's existential 
identity. It is now widely acknowledged that extended working hours and working 
pressure can lead to stress and anxiety, but there is an argument that the problem runs 
beyond that. Stress and anxiety can be alleviated by removing the stressors and 
prescribing rest and recuperation. Attacks on identity, on the other hand, have the 
potential to be much more damaging, particularly for those prone to ontological 
insecurity, and longer lasting. Attempts to interfere with individual identity characterize a 
particularly unethical aspect of organizational life, because the techniques utilised are 
often quite subtle and difficult for the individual to detect and react against; because the 
impact can be so deep set; and because the damage can be relatively long lasting. 
References 
Alge, B.J. 2001. 'Effects of computer surveillance on perceptions of privacy and 
procedural justice'. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86 (4), 797-804. 
Arnold , J., Cooper, C. and Robertson, I. 2005. Work Psychology: Understanding Human 
Behaviour in the Workplace, 4th ed. Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
Arthur, A.R. 2002. 'Mental health problems and British workers: a survey of mental 
health problems in employees who receive counseling from Employee Assistance 
Programmes'. Stress and Health, 18, 69-74. 
Ashforth, B. and Humphrey, R. 1993. 'Emotional labour in service roles: The influence of 
identity'. Academy of Management Review, 18 (1), 88-115. 
Author removed for review purposes, 1999. 'Should we expect commitment?'. 
Community, Work and Family, 2:3, 311-315. 
Author removed for review purposes, 2006a. 'The Ethics of Organizational Commitment' , 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 15(2), 142-153 .. 
Author removed for review purposes, 2006b. 'Business Ethics and Existentialism', 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 15(3), 218-233. 
Barnes, H.E. 1993. 'Sartre's Concept of the Self , in Hoeller, K. (Ed) Sartre and 
Psychology, New Jersey, Humanities Press. 
BBC 1992. Public Eye: The Mind Managers (television broadcast). 
BBC 2004. 'Cost of the 'Sicknote Scandal" archived at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4045331.stm accessed 22.5.2006. 
Brown, W. S. 2000. 'Ontological insecurity. Existential anxiety and workplace privacy' . 
Journal of Business Ethics, 23 (1), 61 -65. 
15 
Bullock, A. and Trombley, S. 1999. The New Fontana Dictionary of Modem Thought, 
London, HarperCollins. 
Collinson, D.L. 2003. 'Identities and insecurities: Selves at work'. Organization, 10(3), 
527-247. 
Constanti, P. and Gibbs, P. 2005. 'Emotional labour and surplus value: the case of 
holiday 'reps". Service Industries Journal, 25 (1 ), 103-116. 
DiTecco, D., Cwito, G., Arsenault, A. and Andre, M. 1992. 'Operator stress and 
monitoring practices', Applied Ergonomics, 23(1 ), 29-34. 
Doherty, N. and Tyson, S. 2000. HRM and Employee Well-Being: Raising the Ethical 
Stakes, In Winstanley, D. and Woodall, J. (eds.) 'Ethical Issues in Contemporary Human 
Resource Management', Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
European Industrial Relations Review 2005. 'Work-life balance: Evidence from across 
the UK', European Industrial Relations Review, issue 380, 27-30. 
Feldman, D.C. and Morris, J.A. 1996. 'The dimensions, antecedents and consequences 
of emotional labour'. Academy of Management Review, 21 (4 ), 986-1010. 
French, W.L. and Bell, C.H. 1999. Organization Development: Behavioral Science 
Interventions for Organization Improvement, Upper Saddle River NJ, Prentice Hall. 
Hansen, S. 2004. 'From 'Common Observation' to behavioural risk management: Work 
place surveillance and employee assistance 1914-2003'. International Sociology, 19(2), 
151-171. 
Hayes, N. 1994. Foundations of Psychology: An Introductory Text, London, Routledge. 
Hemp, P. 2004. 'Presenteeism: At Work- But Out Of It'. Harvard Business Review, 
October, 49-58. 
HSE 2001. Advice Regarding Call Centre Working Practices, available at 
www.HSE.org.uk. 
Hochschild, A.R. 2003. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, 
London, University of California Press. 
Ivanov, I. 2005. Mental Health and Working Life. WHO Ministerial Conference on Mental 
Health Briefing Paper. Copenhagen: World Health Organization Regional Office for 
Europe. 
Jackson, N. and Carter, P. 2000. Rethinking Organizational Behaviour, Harlow, 
FT /Prentice Hall. 
Laing, R.D. 1990. The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
16 
Laing, R.D. and Esterson, A. 1970. Sanity, Madness and the Family, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin. 
Lasch, C. 1985. The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times, London, Pan 
Books. 
Lee, S. and Kleiner, B.H. 2003. 'Electronic surveillance in the workplace'. Management 
Research News, 26, pp. 72-81. 
Lewis, K.A. and Dollard, M.F. 2003. 'Emotional dissonance, emotional exhaustion and 
job satisfaction in call centre workers', European journal of work and Organizational 
Psychology, 12(4), pp. 366-392. 
McDaid, D., Curran, C. and Knapp, M. 2005. 'Promoting mental well-being in the 
workplace: A European policy perspective', International Review of Psychiatry, 17{5), 
365-373. 
Mann, S 1999. 'Emotion at work: To what extent are we expressing, suppressing it, or 
faking it?' European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, (3), 347-369. 
Maslach, C. and Jackson, S.E. 1981. 'The measurement of experienced burnout'. 
Journal of Occupational Behaviour, 2, 99-113. 
Mead, G. H. 1934. Mind, self and society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Mental Health Foundation 2003. Whose Life is it Anyway? A report on the effects of poor 
work-life balance on mental health, available at www.mentalhealth.org.uk. 
Mental Health Foundation 2002. Out at Work: A survey of the experiences of people with 
mental health problems within the workplace, available at www.mentalhealth.org.uk. 
Miller, S. and Weckert, J. 2000. 'Privacy, the workplace and the internet'. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 28, 255-265. 
Mind 2005. Stress and Mental Health in the Workplace, available at www.mind.orq.uk. 
Myerson, G. 2001. 101 Key Ideas: Existentialism, London, McGraw-Hill. 
Nye, D. 2002. 'The 'privacy in employment' critique: a consideration of some of the 
arguments for 'ethical' HRM professional practice', Business Ethics: A European 
Review, 11 (3}, 224-232. 
Porter, R. 2002. Madness: A Brief History, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Potter, B. 2001 . 'Comprehending Madness: The Contextualization of Psychopathology in 
the Work of R.D. Laing', available at www.laingsociety.org/ psychotherapy/ potter.htm 
accessed 4/12/2005. 
Sartre, J-P. 1960. The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of 
Consciousness, translated by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, New York, Hill 
and Wang. 
17 
Sartre, J-P. 1982. In Camera and Other Plays, translated by Stuart Gilbert, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Sartre, J-P 1996. Being and Nothingness, translated by, Hazel Barnes, London, 
Routledge. 
Smith, M.J., Carayon, P., Sanders, K.J., Lim, S.Y. and LeGrande, D. 1992. 'Employee 
stress and health complaints in jobs with and without electronic performance monitoring ', 
Applied Ergonomics, 23(1 ), 17-28. 
Sveningsson, S. and Alvesson, M. 2003. 'Managing managerial identities: 
Organizational fragmentation, discourse and identity struggle'. Human Relations, 56 
(1 0), 1163-1193. 
Woodall, J. and Douglas. 1999. 'Ethical issues in contemporary human resource 
development'. Business Ethics: A European Review, 8(4), 249-261. 
White, L.P. and Whooten, K.C. 1983. 'Ethical dilemmas in various stages of organization 
development'. Academy of Management Review, 8(4), 690-697. 
Work-Life Balance Centre 2006. The 24-7 Work-Life Balance Survey available at 
www.24-7survey.co.uk. 
Woodward, K. 2002. Understanding Identity, London, Arnold. 
Zammuner, V.L. and Galli, C. 2005. 'Wellbeing: Cause and consequences of emotion 
regulation in the work setting'. International Review of Psychiatry, 17(5), 355-364. 
Zapf, D. and Holz, M. 2006. 'On the positive and negative effects of emotion work in 
organizations'. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 15(1 ), 1-28. 
Zapf, D. Vogt, C. Seifert, C. Mertini, H. lsic, A. 1999. 'Emotion work as a source of 
stress: The concept and development of an instrument'. European Journal of Work and 
Organizational Psychology. 8(3), 371-400. 
18 
Volume 1. No. 1 Determinants of Remittances: The Case of the South Asian 
Community in Manchester, 
Authors Thankom Arun, Hulya Ulku 
Volume 1. No. 2 British Trade Unions and the European Project: The Legacy of 
the 1975 European UK Referendum. 
Author Professor Phil Whyman 
Volume 1. No 3 Existential Identity, Ontological Insecurity and Mental Well-being 
in the Workplace 
Authors Dr lan Ashman And Caroline Gibson 
19 
